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Abstract – There has long been a minority view that providing people with cash is an 
effective way of combating poverty and economic insecurity while promoting 
livelihoods and work. The mainstream view has nevertheless been that giving people 
money, without conditions or obligations, promotes idleness and dependency, while 
being unnecessarily costly. This paper reviews recent evidence on various types of 
schemes implemented in developing countries, including several pilot cash transfer 
schemes, assessing them by reference to principles of social justice. It concludes that 
experience with cash transfers is strengthening the case for a universal basic income. 
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Politicians and policymakers in developing countries, and most donor agencies, 
including the international financial agencies, have long dismissed the idea that 
poverty and unemployment can be redressed through cash transfers. They have 
relied on some nucleus of social insurance and means-tested social assistance for 
those affected by particular contingency risks, such as accidents, loss of job, 
disability or old age. Many have shown a remarkable enthusiasm for public 
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 works. But they have given a very limited role to cash transfers per se. Recently, 
that has begun to change.  
One reason is that the persistence and aggravation of poverty and inequality 
under globalization defy the oft-made prediction that economic growth will 
“trickle down” to the poor and economically insecure. Another reason is that 
other forms of aid have been shown to have limited effectiveness, especially in 
contexts of systemic shocks, where there are mass entitlement failures in which 
whole communities are blighted by an economic setback, an ecological disaster 
or an epidemic. 
This article first presents some principles for assessing the effectiveness of 
various forms of income-support scheme in combating economic insecurity. In 
the light of those principles it goes on to review experience with food aid and 
vouchers, seen as the main alternatives to cash transfers, before discussing the 
growing use in developing countries of both conditional and unconditional cash 
transfers. Separate sections deal with cash transfers in emergency and 
development aid, incomes for school attendance, social pensions and disability 
grants. In concluding remarks, it is argued that experience with cash transfer 
schemes to date gives empirical support to arguments in favour of a universal 
unconditional basic income. 
1. Economic Insecurity and Social Justice Principles 
In assessing the potential of cash transfers, it may be useful to identify the nature 
of economic insecurity, clarify types of income-support scheme, and set out some 
principles or criteria by which to judge alternative ways of assisting the 
economically insecure and disadvantaged. 
1.1 Economic Insecurity 
Briefly, economic insecurity reflects exposure to several forms of risk and 
uncertainty and a limited capacity to cope with adverse outcomes and recover 
from them. To a greater or lesser extent, any individual could be said to be 
exposed to idiosyncratic risk that reflects life-cycle contingencies, such as a spell 
of unemployment, an illness or a disabling accident. This is the sphere of classic 
social security schemes. But there is also co-variant risk, where one adverse event 
has a high probability of triggering others, and systemic risk, where whole 
communities are exposed. 
This leads to the distinction between shocks and hazards. Shocks have 
become more numerous as a result of globalization and global warming. 
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 Included are sharp economic downturns that sweep entire communities, 
economies or regions. More generally, there are circumstances that one can 
characterise as socio-economic disasters, whether they be quick-onset disasters, 
as in the case of earthquakes, floods, tsunamis or a sudden economic collapse, or 
slow-onset disasters, as in the case of droughts, famines, or an epidemic such as 
HIV/AIDS. 
These situations of shock should be distinguished from the notion of 
hazards, which are important sources of economic insecurity in many 
developing countries. Hazards may be defined as predictable (and often desired) 
life events that have a high probability of an adverse effect, or a sequence of 
adverse effects, for an individual or family. They include a death of a relative, 
weddings, births, a migration event, and retirement. 
Whether shock or hazard, the resultant costs can erode a household’s 
capacity to sustain its normal livelihood base, perhaps by pushing it into debt or 
into mortgaging land, or by preventing it from buying seeds or fertilisers. 
Economic insecurity also arises from uncertainty. With uncertainty, one is 
unsure about one’s actual interests or unsure how to realise them. The outcome 
of decisions cannot be predicted with any confidence, and often this is combined 
with a perceived inability to know what to do if an adverse outcome materialises. 
A high degree of uncertainty pushes people into more risk-averse behaviour, 
especially if the consequences of an adverse outcome could be catastrophic. 
Those producing in agrarian economies or where economic activity is dependent 
on climate conditions are likely to face chronic uncertainty. Anything that 
lessened that uncertainty could be expected to have a beneficial effect on higher-
yielding investment, innovation and purposive decision-making. 
So, security arises from being able to deal with shocks, hazards and 
uncertainty. Although it will not be argued here, it is a premise of this article that 
basic economic security is essential for freedom and development. Basic 
economic security is in turn defined as a threefold set of circumstances. First, it 
requires limited exposure to idiosyncratic, co-variant and systemic risks, 
uncertainty, hazards and shocks. Second, it requires an ability to cope if they 
materialise. And third, it requires an ability to recover from adverse outcomes. 
1.2 Types of Income Support Scheme 
With those points in mind, to assess possible policies a further set of distinctions 
should be made. We may say that a scheme is universalistic if it is intended as a 
right for all the population, although perhaps based on citizenship or long-term 
residence. A scheme is targeted if it is intended for a specific group, defined by 
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 some test of eligibility, be it poverty, age, employment capacity or whatever. A 
scheme is selective if it uses some specified criteria to determine eligibility, such 
as a means test. A scheme is conditional if it requires some specified behaviour, 
usually work-related, on the part of the recipient, or in some cases family 
members of the recipient. 
In practice, there are instances of targeted universalistic schemes for which 
all those belonging to a particular group are eligible regardless of their means. 
An example is the universalistic social pension introduced in several countries, 
such as Namibia and Mauritius. More common at the moment are targeted 
selective schemes, which define intended beneficiaries by their social group (e.g., 
women with young children) and by their poverty (having an income or assets 
below some threshold value). 
Means testing has been criticised as inequitable and a deterrent to work, 
especially for low-skilled workers, through what are known as poverty traps or 
unemployment traps. In developing countries, the problems are compounded by 
the difficulty of applying meaningful tests to undocumented incomes that may 
fluctuate erratically and substantially. This has prompted many countries to 
resort to proxy means testing, where visible indicators of income (such as quality 
of housing) are used to determine eligibility for a particular benefit, since it was 
first tried in Chile in 1980 (Clert and Woden, 2001; Raczynski, 1991). 
Proxy means testing requires selection of relevant proxy indicators of social 
deprivation, such as location of residence, quality of dwelling or type of 
economic activity the household is engaged in. None of these is a very reliable 
indicator of poverty per se. Accordingly, some authorities have been drawn to 
rely on relatively sophisticated statistical models using a few variables to 
estimate the profile of somebody who should be regarded as in need. However, 
the technique is prone to all three types of failure that should be used to assess 
any social protection scheme. 
Schemes can have a high or low exclusion error – that is, they may exclude a 
large or small number of those for whom the benefit is supposedly intended. 
This is particularly likely with area-based targeting. Schemes may also have a 
high or low inclusion error – that is, they may include people for whom the 
benefit is not intended. Third, schemes may have a high administrative cost 
relative to the cost of the overall scheme. Many schemes are vitiated by excessive 
administrative costs that mean that far fewer people can be beneficiaries, given 
limited resources. 
In the case of proxy means tests, collecting and analyzing data to be used in 
a formula to identify the targeted group will involve hefty administrative costs. 
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 There will also be substantial exclusion errors, since even the best econometric 
equations estimate only about 50 percent of the variability of income, implying a 
very imperfect means of identification of potential recipients (Coady, Grosh and 
Hoddinnott, 2004). Such schemes also involve obvious immoral hazards if the 
proxy indicator is known to the possible recipients. 
1.3 Policy Evaluation Principles 
Following earlier work1, this paper is based on a belief that policies should be 
judged, or evaluated, by whether or not they satisfy the following five policy 
principles:  
The Security Difference Principle – A policy or institutional change is socially just 
only if it improves the security of the least secure groups in society. The Security 
Difference Principle stems from Rawls, who from a liberal philosophical 
perspective essentially argued that social and economic inequalities are 
only just if they allow for the betterment of the worst-off groups in society 
(Rawls, 1973). 
The Paternalism Test Principle – A policy or institutional change is socially just 
only if it does not impose controls on some groups that are not imposed on the most 
free groups in society. Underlying this principle is the Millian liberal view 
that there is a prima facie case against paternalism (except in the case of 
young children and those who are medically frail), particularly against 
those forms that constrain the freedoms of the disadvantaged. 
The Rights-Not-Charity Principle – A policy or institutional change is socially just 
if it enhances the rights of the recipient of benefits or services and limits the 
discretionary power of the providers. This third principle is also crucial for 
assessing alternative benefit schemes. A right is possessed by virtue of a 
person’s humanity or citizenship, and cannot be made dependent on some 
behavioural conditionality. Social and economic entitlements should be 
rights, not matters for the discretionary decisions of bureaucrats or 
philanthropists or aid donors. 
The Ecological Constraint Principle – A policy or institutional change is socially 
just only if it does not involve an ecological cost borne by the community or by 
those directly affected. Benefit schemes should be subject to the constraint that 
they should not deliberately or carelessly jeopardise the environment. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, ILO (2004). The writer was principal author of that report, which drew on extensive 
empirical work cited in it. See also, Standing (2002). 
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 The Dignified Work Principle – A policy or institutional change is just only if it 
does not impede people from pursuing work in a dignified way and if it does not 
disadvantage the most insecure groups in that respect. The two-part test in this 
principle involves two implicit value judgements – that work that is 
dignifying is worth promoting (whereas any deterioration in working 
conditions or in opportunities would not be), and that the policy should 
enhance the range and quality of work options of the most insecure groups 
relative to others, or more than for others. The main point is to determine 
whether or not a scheme favours the development of more freely chosen 
work opportunities and work capabilities. 
Before proceeding, it is also worth recalling Tony Atkinson’s two measures 
of poverty-reduction efficiency – vertical and horizontal, the former measuring 
the extent to which there is leakage of money intended for the poor going to the 
non-poor, the latter measuring the extent to which the poor are actually helped 
(Atkinson, 1995). 
The difficulty with this dualism is that, for example, a scheme may reach 70 
percent of a target group, but they may be the least severely affected, leaving the 
worst-off 30 percent no better off or even worse off. Using the horizontal-vertical 
efficiency approach could produce other difficulties. For instance, if another 
programme reached 70 percent who were the worst-off and did so at the cost of 
some leakage to the non-poor, that might be judged less efficient. It is thus 
advisable to be cautious about evaluating policies using the language of 
efficiency. 
The following discussion looks first at the main alternatives to direct cash 
transfers and then turns to a more detailed discussion of conditional and 
universal forms of transfer. It leaves out of consideration cash-for-work and 
emergency public works schemes, which the author has written about elsewhere 
(United Nations, 2007, ch. VI). 
2. Food Aid 
The primary claim in favour of food aid, including subsidized food, is that it 
responds to the priority needs of the poor. It is an anti-poverty device. It is also 
perceived as horizontally efficient in that it is self-selecting. The poor will want 
the food aid; the wealthier will not. Food aid, it is reasoned, will also be relatively 
appreciated by recipients, as well as easy to legitimize with donors and the 
median voter. 
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 The main criticism of food aid is that the vulnerable may not lack food per 
se, or may not see their future as made secure by access to more food. Such 
commodity-based aid is also paternalistic, in that it presumes that what people 
want is more food, and/or that they would not spend money on food if given the 
freedom to make choices for themselves. 
Food aid is also potentially market distorting, eroding incentives for local 
farmers, especially if the food is coming from outside the community. It can thus 
disrupt local livelihoods and employment. Even the prospect of an influx of food 
aid can act as a deterrent to local farmers or producers or market traders. It may 
thus fail the Dignified Work Principle. 
Food aid and subsidies also engender a sense of charity rather than 
economic rights. As with all subsidies, the food will be less appreciated than if 
the actual monetary value was paid. Food aid will therefore tend to result in 
waste, due to undervaluation, and/or excessive consumption just because it is 
“free” (Tabor, 2002). Distributing food aid also has high transaction and 
administrative costs. For instance, in India, the widely used meals-for-school 
scheme is notorious – each rupee of food costs a rupee to distribute. 
Finally, food aid often leads to perverse targeting, reaching those without 
much need for food while not reaching those who do need it, who may be more 
inaccessible.2 Thus it may, perversely, fail to satisfy the Security Difference 
Principle as well.  
Though food aid has been the classic form of aid in times of emergency, 
there is growing recognition that to be effective it must be combined with cash 
grants if the intervention is to prevent the collapse of livelihood capacity in the 
affected communities. There is now considerable evidence from food-aid 
schemes that, without monetary assistance, many recipients are obliged to sell 
their food aid or cannot retain their land or raw materials because of 
accumulating debt. This was found to be the case, for instance, in an evaluation 
of food aid given to refugees in Chad (LeJeune, 2004) and in a review of 
emergency food interventions in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Levine and 
Chastre, 2004). 
In Afghanistan, beneficiaries of food aid were found to be selling the food 
they had received for less than a third of the cost of its delivery (Development 
Researchers Network, 2003). And an evaluation of food aid in Ethiopia 
concluded that households would have taken much less in cash than the market 
                                                 
2 A series of People’s Security Surveys in Africa and Asia found that it was the near-poor who were more likely 
to be aware of such schemes and more likely to benefit from them compared with the poor or destitute (ILO, 
2004). 
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 value of their food aid and been equally satisfied (Barrett and Clay, 2003; see also 
Barrett, Holden and Clay, 2002). Cash would have been less expensive, and 
would have been freedom-enhancing. Yet paternalism has typically prevailed, at 
the cost of limiting the revival capacities in local communities. 
3. Vouchers and Food Stamps 
The most common voucher schemes in developing countries have been for seeds 
and other agricultural inputs, the intention being to boost agricultural output 
and employment while curbing food poverty. Vouchers have also been used in 
foreign aid to communities hit by economic or natural disasters, for instance, in 
the aftermath of the tsunami, in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere, in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, and by the UK Government in its response to the 
Montserrat volcanic eruption. Significantly, in the last case, the authorities 
eventually switched to cash grants after recipients complained that the vouchers 
were too restrictive. 
Among the claims in favour of vouchers is that they are, or could be made, 
self-selecting of those in need, if the items that can be obtained with the vouchers 
are what the wealthy have in abundance or simply do not want. Some have even 
argued that there should be a stigma attached to receipt of vouchers precisely to 
increase the self-selectivity of the poor. 
One criticism of vouchers is that they require considerable planning and 
preparation, including the agreement of local traders to accept the vouchers. 
There have been reports that shops do not like dealing with vouchers because 
they involve extra administrative costs and uncertainty about reimbursement. 
Another criticism is that – contrary to the claim that they promote self-
selection – the stigmatisation entailed by vouchers leads to lower take-up, not 
higher. Applying for and using a voucher are visible transactions that signal 
poverty or dependency, and there is no reason to presume that this will result in 
self-selection by the poorest and most insecure. In the UK, to take an extreme 
case, the Government had to abandon a special voucher scheme for asylum 
seekers because recipients were being identified and harassed. 
Almost by definition, vouchers are paternalistic, in that they involve a 
decision by the state (or donor) on what people should be spending money. 
However benevolent and well-meaning, that is undeniably a restriction of 
individual liberty. This is perhaps why the best form seems to have been “seed 
vouchers” combined with “seed fairs”, in which the paternalistic element has 
been moderated by enabling recipients to choose from among a large range of 
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 seeds. There have been reports that such seed fairs have worked quite well in 
various parts of Africa. 
Any subsidy tends to distort spending patterns. Extensive research has 
shown that the US food stamps programme has resulted in people buying more 
food than they would have done had they received the equivalent in cash. Given 
the high incidence of obesity among the US poor, that in itself would be a reason 
to convert the voucher scheme into a cash transfer. Giving cash would not ensure 
that it was spent on healthier food, but there would be a lower probability that it 
would be spent on excessive food. How it would be spent would be a matter of 
individual freedom. 
4. Conditional Cash Transfers 
As noted at the outset, until recently there was little interest in the idea of using 
cash transfers as a means of reducing poverty in developing countries, even as 
part of international aid in times of emergency. Thus a review of all UN 
consolidated aid appeals in 2004 found almost no use of cash or vouchers; the 
appeals were dominated by traditional humanitarian responses, such as food aid, 
materials for shelter, clothing, seeds and so on. 
However, there is a growing movement in favour of introducing cash 
transfers and even universal income grants in developing countries where it is 
commonly claimed that no universal system of social protection is financially 
feasible. As a senior World Bank economist, in surveying the empirical literature, 
put it: 
The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles 
is that income transfers to the poor, and safety net policies more 
generally, are at best a short term palliative and at worst a waste of 
money. These views are starting to be questioned at two levels. 
Firstly, evidence from careful evaluations has pointed to a number of 
success stories.…Secondly, the presumption of an overall trade-off 
between redistribution or insurance (on the one hand) and growth 
(on the other) has come to be questioned (Ravallion, 2003). 
Claims in favour of unconditional cash transfers overlap to a certain extent 
with claims for so-called conditional cash transfers. Currently, the latter are the 
type in vogue, though the distinction is not as sharp as is sometimes depicted. 
One reason is that in some cases policymakers and their advisers use 
conditionality as a political device to legitimize the transfer with middle-class 
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 voters and financial agencies.3 In practice too, the difficulty and costs of 
implementing the criteria used for identifying beneficiaries can lead to merely 
token or discretionary application of the formal conditions. This has been the 
case of the state old-age pension in South Africa, which has been a celebrated 
success in redistributing income and boosting local small-scale economic 
activities. 
Nevertheless, when commentators talk about conditional cash transfers they 
usually, at present, mean a selectivity device that goes beyond conventional 
means testing. The most well-known is the requirement that recipients should 
send their children to school. This is a form of paternalism, but it is a modest one 
given that society usually has a constitutional commitment to ensure that 
children are enrolled in and attend school. Other forms of conditionality are 
harder to rationalize on ethical or freedom-enhancement grounds. 
It is a contention guiding this article that the growing interest in conditional 
cash transfers as an aid and development tool will lead to a realization that most 
forms of selectivity and conditionality are conveniences at best while being 
costly, inequitable, inefficient and offensive to basic egalitarian principles. 
Nevertheless, the current phase of policy development is promising because 
experimentation with conditional cash transfers is proving that they can and do 
have a beneficial development role. We will return to unconditional, universal 
income transfers later. 
5. Cash Transfers in Emergency and Development Aid 
Whatever the claims and counter-claims, support for providing the poor and 
disadvantaged with straightforward cash grants has taken off. Examples of 
experimental schemes are multiplying. Their advantages include speed, 
transparency and the ability to allow those in need to make choices about how 
they spend the aid, thereby enabling them to retain a greater sense of dignity in 
times of crisis (Creti and Jaspars, 2006). 
Based on experience in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Oxfam has issued 
guidelines for such schemes, recognizing that they are particularly appropriate 
for socio-economic crises where local purchasing power has been wiped out 
while food and other basic goods are potentially available. 
They also have low administrative costs. As a World Bank study on 
Colombia’s experience with cash transfers concluded: 
                                                 
3 This was a common theme among early advocates of the Bolsa Escola and Renda Minima schemes in Brazil. 
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 The cost of SISBEN design and application has been modest in 
absolute terms (about US$0.21 per person in the registry, US$0.52 per 
beneficiary), and relative to the total amount of resources that have 
been targeted with SISBEN. It has been estimated that to target 
US$100 dollars to a beneficiary costs less than US$70 cents. For some 
programs, such as the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT-Familias en 
Acción), the cost of SISBEN is about 0.5 percent of the total cost of the 
program (assuming this is the only program using SISBEN) 
(Castañeda, 2003). 
A cash transfer scheme that has been carefully evaluated is the Cash for 
Relief Programme (CfR) in Ethiopia. One of its primary objectives was to enable 
households hit by crop failure to rebuild their assets. The evaluation for the 
primary funders of the scheme, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), found that the cash grants had been very successful in regenerating 
livelihoods (Brandsetter, 2004). Rather than merely consume (which would have 
been likely with food aid alone), the recipients had controlled debts and invested 
in restoring land productivity. The donors found that cash grants “allowed 
individuals and communities to begin making a series of decisions, giving them 
the power to prioritise needs for their families and presenting them with a 
creative way to receive relief assistance with dignity” (USAID, 2004). 
An evaluation carried out for Save the Children, a UK-based NGO, of the 
Meket Livelihood Development Pilot Project, involving cash transfers provided 
in two areas of Ethiopia in 2001–2004, found that the cost of implementing the 
scheme was much less than the equivalent for food-aid schemes (Kebede, 2005). 
The latter also had substantial transaction costs for beneficiaries (which are rarely 
taken into account in monitoring and evaluation analyses), including time spent 
waiting for deliveries and sharing out food as well as the work involved in 
loading and transporting the aid. 
By contrast, cash transfers allowed the beneficiaries to make strategic choices 
for themselves. The evaluation observed that not only did the cash transfers 
allow households to build up assets, notably through the acquisition of livestock, 
but they also enabled many households to reduce distress renting out of land. 
Indeed, among the benefits were that they enabled recipients to obtain higher 
crop prices, partly because they were able to sell when prices were more 
favourable, rather than when they were desperate for cash. This is a classic 
advantage of basic economic security. They also helped some recipients to pay 
off debts, others to pool savings in an equb (group saving scheme) and others to 
buy seeds, sheep or goats, thereby enabling them to work. 
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 Evaluations of several other cash relief projects in Ethiopia implemented by 
Save the Children in response to food crises have concluded that they too have 
functioned efficiently, proved more cost-effective than food aid and had no 
inflationary effect (Gebre-Selassie and Beshah, 2003; Save the Children UK, 2004; 
Knox-Peebles, 2001). Successful cash relief programmes have also been 
implemented in north-eastern Somalia (the Emergency Cash Relief Program), 
and in two districts of Zambia (the pilot Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme) 
initiated by the Zambian Government with financial support from the German 
development agency GTZ. 
 Those operating the Zambian scheme, which focused on very poor 
households with little access to paid work, have claimed that the money was 
spent on basic consumption goods and education and healthcare for family 
members (Schubert, 2005). In other words, people were able to spend such cash 
transfers rationally and for their own longer-term welfare. A majority of the 
beneficiary households were headed by elderly persons or women, about half of 
the households were AIDS-affected, and nearly half contained orphans. As with 
other schemes of this sort, it was evident that when women, rather than men, 
controlled the transfers they were more likely to spend a large part of them on 
their children and their family. 
The Zambian scheme had a more general message. It has been estimated that 
if it were scaled up to reach the poorest 10 percent of all Zambian households the 
cost would amount to merely 5 percent of the total overseas aid to the country, or 
about 0.5 percent of its Gross National Income. In other words, a national scheme 
is financially feasible. It would be much cheaper than the country’s food aid, and 
would have the advantage of going directly to the poor and vulnerable, without 
the high administrative costs and various forms of corruption associated with 
commodity-based schemes. And whereas food aid damages local food markets 
by deterring local producers, cash transfers would do the opposite by helping to 
stimulate local markets. In Zambia, no less than 70 percent of all social transfers 
are spent on locally produced goods and services, thus generating local 
employment or livelihoods (DFID, 2005; Samson and others, 2006). 
The Zambian, Ethiopian and Somalian cash transfer experiences offer 
encouraging evidence that they are affordable and are conducive to livelihood 
revival in chronically poor areas. Of course, in times of emergency, cash grants 
should not be seen as pure alternatives to other forms of commodity-based aid. 
Such transfers might be inflationary if local food supplies were not available. In 
the initial aftermath of a disaster, particularly a quick-onset disaster, food aid 
may need to complement cash transfers, to restrain inflationary pressures. Direct 
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 commodity aid can then be gradually phased out as local producers respond to 
the increased demand for staple goods and services. However, cash transfers 
may need complementary programmes designed to boost local supply, as was 
found to be the case following the Mozambique floods in 2000. 
Under this scheme, which was implemented by the private sector, USAID 
funded cash grants of about US$92 for 106,280 flood-affected rural families. An 
impact evaluation found that most of the money was spent on local goods and 
services, which stimulated the local economy, regenerating livelihoods in a 
sustainable way (Abt Associates, 2002; Christie and Hanlon, 2001; Hanlon, 2004). 
Among the growing number of schemes launched outside Africa as part of 
emergency and rehabilitation programmes funded by foreign donors is the Cash 
for Herder scheme in Mongolia, implemented by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Red Cross in 2002–2003. The 
evaluation two years later found that while another in-kind project that they had 
operated was “appreciated” by recipients, it had not helped regenerate the local 
economy, whereas the cash transfer had led to investment in assets that 
regenerated livelihoods. The evaluation concluded, 
The cash approach made use of the creativity and experience of 
beneficiary families to develop strategies out of their crisis…[It] 
showed that poor people and people under severe economic stress 
are very well capable to handle cash responsibly and develop and 
take strategic decisions on what to spend the money in order to 
improve the livelihood and their families in the medium and long 
term…most important, beneficiaries do become economic and social 
actors in their own community again, taking their decisions on how 
to spend the money (SDC-IFRC, 2005). 
The evaluation found additional advantages, in that “the response and 
preparation time” was short, and administrative overheads were low. By 2005, 
the SDC had implemented 13 cash grant projects of this type in eight countries. 
Tellingly, the growing legitimacy of simple cash transfers was reflected in 
the Group of Eight Statement of 2004, which, when referring to the international 
response to famines, made the commitment, “we will unleash the power of 
markets through cash-for-work and cash-for-relief programs” (G8 Statement, 
2004). The scope for cash transfers in Africa and Asia is thus recognized as part 
of the armoury of aid and humanitarian responses to poverty and insecurity. 
Meanwhile, in Latin America, cash transfers have become a central part of social 
and development policy. 
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 6. Incomes for School Attendance and Child Benefits 
One form of conditional cash transfer that has become enormously popular in 
the past decade or so is a monthly sum of money paid to poor families, or more 
usually to mothers, on condition that their children attend school. The main 
claim is that incomes for school attendance lower the poverty and economic 
insecurity of women and lower child poverty. It is hard to dispute this. By the 
same token, it is claimed that they reduce child malnutrition, as well as promote 
child school enrolment and school attendance. Such schemes are obviously less 
paternalistic than food parcels and food aid, or other commodity-based forms of 
transfer to the poor. They are also a means of redistributing income that is 
relatively easily legitimized among the middle class and “median voters”. 
Critics argue that, by focusing only on school-age children, these schemes 
neglect families with children under the age of seven, the group most at risk of 
ill-health due to malnutrition and impoverishment. There are also claims that 
they discourage female labour force participation, and that they involve high 
administrative costs, particularly as they are means-tested. 
These criticisms have been swept aside for the moment. Country after 
country has opted for this policy. The main examples are in Central and South 
America, starting in Mexico, where the original Progresa (literally “progressing”) 
scheme, introduced in 1992, has evolved into the Oportunidades scheme.4 
Progresa was supposed to support school-age children in poor households in 
marginalized rural communities, but in 2002 Oportunidades extended that aid to 
other rural and urban areas. 
The Mexican scheme has evolved into a complex mechanism of social 
engineering. The cash transfer consists of three components – a household 
nutrition allowance, a schooling subsidy for each school-age child that rises in 
amount by grade and that is higher for girls of secondary-school age, and an 
annual payment to cover the cost of books and uniforms. To complete the social 
engineering function, the amount of cash transfer that any household can receive 
is capped, one intention being to avoid giving families an incentive to have more 
children, another being to reduce what the policymakers think might be benefit 
dependence. To receive the transfers, children must maintain a school attendance 
record of 85 percent, while mothers and children must have regular medical 
checks and parents must attend parenting classes. 
                                                 
4 The original scheme was called the programme for education, health and nutrition, symbolizing its multiple 
objectives. 
14 Basic Income Studies Vol. 3 [2008], No. 1, Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/bis/vol3/iss1/art5
 The targeting takes place via a two-stage process. First, poor geographical 
areas are identified and then poorer households in those areas are identified on 
the basis of a proxy index of poverty (using indicators of housing, health, and 
schooling). As a result of this procedure, about three million Mexican households 
are reached at any one time. 
Although awkward questions remain about the efficiency and equity of the 
selectivity process, Progresa has been legitimized. It has been shown to be less 
expensive to distribute than food aid (Gertler, 2005). Above all, it has been shown 
to have reduced poverty in recipient households and to have resulted in 
increased school enrolment and attendance, as well as improved health in 
beneficiary households (Skoufias, 2001). Oportunidades can be expected to do 
much the same. In short, the Mexican scheme has become a central part of the 
country’s social protection system. 
The other major example is Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (“family stipend”), the 
flagship of the country’s cash transfer schemes, which undoubtedly contributed 
to President Lula’s re-election in October 2006. It evolved from a series of 
localized schemes introduced in urban areas during the 1990s. Among the 
precursors were the PETI (Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour), 
introduced in 1996 in coalmining areas, then sugar cane and sisal production 
areas, and subsequently extended to all areas in 1999. Various forms of Bolsa 
Escola (“school stipend”) and Renda Minima (“minimum income”) schemes 
spread in the late 1990s; these became a federal programme in 2001, which 
reached over eight million children in five million households by 2003. In 2004, 
four income transfer schemes, including the Bolsa Escola, were consolidated into 
the Bolsa Familia. 
This became a central part of the Lula Government’s Zero Fome (“Zero 
Hunger”) campaign, and has been seen as a way of reducing the country’s 
enormous income inequality. It has also unified a variety of more paternalistic 
and selective schemes, such as the gas allowance and school stipends. An 
intention has been to break the inter-generational transfer of poverty by 
conditioning access to the transfers on key human development objectives 
(schooling, nutrition and health). It is also seen as a means of “empowering” 
women, giving them more bargaining power in their households and enabling 
them to make decisions on their children’s education and on their own work. 
By 2006, the Bolsa Familia was reaching over 11 million households living 
below the official poverty line, or over 44 million people. The scheme is 
nominally means-tested, with the transfer amount being determined by number 
of children in the household. Autonomy is granted in the sense that recipients 
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 can choose how to spend the money, but the conditionalities (“incentives”) are 
restraining, and include school attendance by children aged 5–15, anti-natal 
classes for pregnant women, and vaccination for children under the age of 7. 
The Bolsa Familia has generated enormous global interest. Although a 
comprehensive evaluation by the Ministry of Social Development had yet to be 
completed at the time of writing, the scheme has been particularly beneficial for 
those lacking access to income-earning employment. Already there have been a 
series of evaluations and monitoring research projects. Some have been critical, 
but most have been favourable (see Britto, 2005; Fonseca, 2006, inter alia). The 
consensus is that the cash transfers have reduced female poverty, increased 
school attendance and learning performance in school, and apparently led to 
increased rather than decreased female labour force participation. Indeed, one 
study of the earlier scheme concluded, “instead of the expected negative 
correlation between Bolsa Escola and work, we find the opposite: those receiving 
the stipend are the ones that work more“ (Schwartzman, 2005). 
The effect on child labour is more nuanced, since cash transfers seem to have 
resulted in children doing fewer hours of labour but not necessarily stopping 
altogether (Cardoso and Souza, 2003; Rocha, 2000). This is partly because 
prohibiting child labour is not a formal part of the programme. Child labour has 
continued to play a significant role in the subsistence survival of poor 
households in rural areas and urban slums, accounting for over 20 percent of 
family income in about a third of all families. The stipend is too modest to 
displace that contribution. 
The Brazilian scheme is well-established, in spite of criticisms of its design. 
In Latin America, at least, it seems the way to move cash transfers up the policy 
ladder. Other schemes similar in type to Progresa and Bolsa Familia are 
Colombia’s Familias en Acción, Honduras’ Programa de Asignación Familiar 
(PRAF), Jamaica’s Programme of Advancement through Health and Education 
(PATH) and Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS), which predated the 
Brazilian model by becoming operational in 2000. There is also growing interest 
outside Latin America and the Caribbean, the beacon being Bangladesh’s Cash 
for Education scheme. In early 2008, the Indian Government was considering the 
Bolsa Familia as an alternative to its wasteful food subsidies.  
To what extent does this type of scheme satisfy the Policy Decision 
Principles enunciated earlier? As operated in Mexico and Brazil, one cannot 
pretend that the policy is not paternalistic. Probably most observers would 
accept that it is desirable to impose conditions that benefit children, and would 
be satisfied with that as long as the scheme did not put families into some kind of 
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 poverty trap. However, the Mexican scheme does seem to go much further, and 
raises questions about the possibility of excessive bureaucratic intervention in 
family life of an intrusive kind that could lead to stigma and even non-
application for the cash transfer. To the extent that there is a political 
commitment to weaken the conditionality rather than to increase it, Brazil’s less 
intrusive Bolsa Familia scores rather better on the Paternalism Test. 
As far as the Security Difference Principle is concerned, the very complexity 
of Mexico’s targeting procedure must raise questions about horizontal efficiency 
and the omission of many of the poorest households. There could also be a 
poverty trap if households lose entitlement to the benefit if they move out of 
poverty, thus discouraging work and modest social mobility. More evidence is 
needed on this. 
As far as targeting is concerned, research has suggested that the Progresa in 
Mexico was quite effective in reaching very poor households in very poor areas, 
but was less effective in reaching the “moderately poor” (Skoufias, 2001, p. 43). 
To that extent, it could be said to have satisfied the Security Difference Principle 
in being horizontally efficient. But in all schemes of this type, conspicuously 
excluded from coverage are households with only pre-school age children and all 
impoverished households without any children, as well as orphans and others 
living outside family households altogether. It cannot be claimed that the 
targeting reaches the most impoverished in society. 
Moreover, in both Nicaragua and Mexico, about 20 percent of the cash 
transfer beneficiaries were non-poor (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinnott, 2004). In 
Bangladesh, where targeting has been much weaker, about 40 percent of 
beneficiaries have been found to be non-poor. Given that targeting is supposed 
to exclude the non-poor, this suggests that none of the schemes has been very 
successful on its own criterion. Whether or not they should be concerned to 
achieve such “efficiency” is another matter. 
Cash transfer schemes of this type also depend on a sophisticated and up-to-
date registration system. Unregistered households cannot obtain benefits, which 
is likely to result in the denial of benefits to a great many families that are poor 
and economically insecure. In addition, the economically insecure tend to have 
incomes that fluctuate above and below any imaginable poverty line, making it a 
bit of a lottery whether or not they manage to qualify. 
To succeed in its broader social aims, this type of conditional income scheme 
depends on there being adequate local schooling and health and transport 
infrastructure. In urban areas of Latin America and the Caribbean, these may 
exist to a sufficient degree. In rural areas of those countries, and in large parts of 
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 Africa and Asia, the imposition of school-attendance and clinic-attendance 
conditions may impose onerous burdens on poor households, and actually hit 
the very poor more than anybody else. 
Even in Latin America, the desirability of the extensive conditionality 
imposed by these schemes has been called into question, which may prompt 
policymakers to conclude that a move towards less conditionality would be a 
more efficient and equitable way to go. The complexity of requiring potential 
beneficiaries to prove they are poor and vulnerable, and to demonstrate regular 
attendance at schools and clinics (or to prove that they had a valid reason for not 
doing so) is surely off-putting for people cowed by poverty and chronic 
insecurity. It is also expensive in administrative time and paperwork (Ayala 
Consulting, 2003). 
The biggest question is one at the heart of all debates on social protection in 
the 21st century. Are all the conditions necessary if the objective is to promote 
human development and if those conditions simply require people to do what is 
in their best interest? Obliging a mother to send a child to school might seem 
obviously beneficial, but the pressure to do so – and the fear of income loss if she 
does not – may lead to the perverse outcome of a mother sending a sick child to 
school, to the longer-term detriment of the child and the family. One can think of 
many other personal circumstances that should cause disquiet. 
The fact is that the imposition of conditions for entitlement presumes that a 
poor person is irrational or incapable of learning, does not know his or her long-
term interests, lacks information or cannot or would not act in the child’s longer-
term interest because of some impediment. Dealing with those issues directly 
would surely be more effective than imposing behavioural conditions that eat up 
public resources in administering them, while perhaps ignoring the structural 
factors that impede seemingly rational behaviour. Even in the case of children, 
one cannot accept state paternalism uncritically. 
This concern is one that may come to preoccupy the second-generation 
reformers as assessments of income-for-school-attendance schemes unfold. What 
is clear is that they are perfectly compatible with more independent economic 
activity. The Dignified Work Principle seems to be supported by the fact that 
women’s labour force participation has been boosted by such schemes, contrary 
to claims that cash transfers foster dependency. 
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 7. Social Pensions 
If Latin America has been the continent leading the way with cash transfers for 
the young, Africa has been the region where non-contributory cash transfers at 
the other end of the age spectrum have been gaining most ground. 
With global ageing and the social dislocation of families that is pushing 
more elderly people out of family-based support networks, support for social 
pensions has grown. Many developing countries have some sort of means-tested 
state pension, but more interesting is the non-means-tested variety, that is, a 
basic universal state pension provided to all citizens above a certain age without 
prior conditions, such as a record of contributions, being required to gain 
entitlement.5 It is sometimes depicted as a primary pillar of a multi-pillar pension 
system. The interest arises not just because it offers the prospect of cutting old-
age poverty quite dramatically but because it may be a productive investment as 
well, directly and indirectly boosting dignified work and livelihoods. 
It seems ironic that social pensions have been pioneered in a few developing 
countries where poverty and inequality are rife and where many economists 
would say there are not the resources available to pay for such schemes. Variants 
exist in South Africa, Namibia, Nepal and Mauritius, where the amount paid 
rises with the age of the pensioner, and Botswana, Bolivia, Samoa, rural areas of 
Brazil and Lesotho, which introduced it in 2004 for those over the age of 70. The 
NOAPS in India (National Old Age Pension Scheme) is tending towards being a 
social pension as well, albeit giving a very small amount and with notorious 
inefficiency. Chile has also recently introduced such a scheme. In addition, by 
2007, over 30 developing countries and transition countries were operating 
means-tested, non-contributory pensions (Johnson and Williamson, 2006). 
Besides enhancing old-age income security, social pensions are potentially 
significant instruments for influencing the patterns of work and labour in society. 
The primary claim in favour of the non-means-tested variant is that it is universal 
and rights-based – all citizens above a certain age are entitled to receive a 
monthly cash transfer. Advocates point out that social pensions reduce old-age 
poverty better than any alternative, are redistributive, affordable and 
transparent, while having very low administrative costs. They typically account 
for a very small percentage of GDP; in Costa Rica, for example, they took only 0.3 
percent in 1999, and in Zimbabwe only 0.1 percent (Coady, Grosh and 
Hoddinott, 2004; Munro, 2003). Another strong empirical finding is that the 
                                                 
5 For one review of these, see Palacios and Sluchynsky (2006). 
19Standing: How Cash Transfers Promote the Case for Basic Income
 South African pension has been the only successful redistributive social policy in 
the post-apartheid era (Case and Deaton, 1998). 
It is still often claimed that social pensions are costly precisely because they 
are universal. The main response to that is that by being universal they reach 
nearly all the elderly, and do so remarkably cheaply. It falls to Namibia to have 
the simplest and most efficient social pension, operated via an electronic card 
and biometric identification of claimants. Each month, vans go to the numerous 
villages and urban payment spots, each van containing cash-dispensing 
machines and computers. The pensioners (or designated surrogates if the 
pensioner is too ill or frail to go) present their cards at the van and are paid the 
equivalent of US$30 (as of 2006). The take-up rate is close to 90 percent, which is 
remarkably high by comparison with all other pension schemes in developing 
countries, and is higher than any means-tested scheme operating anywhere. 
The scheme in Namibia is administered by a private company on contract to 
the Government. The costs are equivalent to about 30 US cents per person per 
month, also remarkably low by comparison with other systems. To counter the 
possibility of fraudulent claims made on behalf of dead people, the authorities 
ingeniously introduced a burial insurance scheme within the pension; the 
pensioner, on registering to receive the pension, takes out a mandatory life 
insurance, whereby funeral costs are covered when he or she dies; application for 
the burial funds enables the authorities to cancel the card at the same time. Given 
the symbolic significance of decent burials and their cost, the insurance scheme 
has been found to be very successful in all respects. 
Also remarkable is the effect on work and livelihoods. Social pensions have 
helped preserve family structures, enabled grandparents to pay for the schooling 
of grandchildren, paid for the care of family members suffering from HIV/AIDS, 
made the elderly creditworthy and promoted sustainable livelihoods, 
particularly in rural areas. 
Too many economists have failed to appreciate that social pensions are 
productive. They have forgotten a lesson from European history, which is that 
old-age security acted as a powerful force in modernizing agriculture, precisely 
because it led to more risk-taking innovation. It has also been shown to do so in 
rural areas of Brazil. As one study concluded, “the regularity, certainty and 
liquidity of pension benefits meant that they played a key role in shifting 
households from subsistence to surplus agriculture” (Barrientos and Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2002, p. 17).6 
                                                 
6 See also Barrientos and others (2003). 
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 Besides its consistency with the Dignified Work Principle, the social pension 
is likely to satisfy the Security Difference Principle if it takes the non-means-
tested form. Being universalistic, it should reach all the poor in the relevant age 
group. It is also paid to individuals rather than households, thus satisfying a 
universalistic concern. It is non-paternalistic, in that it allows the beneficiary to 
spend on what he or she chooses; and it is granted as a right rather than a 
discretionary matter of charity. In brief, it is a feasible first step in the direction of 
a universal right to income security. 
The debate on whether a basic state pension should be universalistic or 
means-tested is rumbling on, but the signs are that the universalistic variant is 
gaining ground. In 2007, South Africa was just one country in which the pressure 
was growing to end the residual use of means testing in its social pension. There 
and elsewhere in Africa, the IMF and other financial agencies have been trying to 
move governments in the other direction – including Namibia. But the evidence 
that this would be sensible from an equity or efficiency point of view is simply 
not there. 
8. Disability Grants 
Disability grants are another form of targeted, selective income transfer. Here we 
will deal with a particular variant, as introduced in southern Africa, in Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. This is an income transfer that is both 
means-tested and work-tested. As operated in the region, it is proving 
disastrous. 
Under the South African scheme, a permanent grant is supposed to be 
available to anyone with a disability that is expected to last for more than a year; 
a temporary grant is supposed to be given to anyone with a recognized disability 
expected to last between six and twelve months. If a person deemed disabled is 
below the age of 18, they can obtain a care dependency grant instead. Access to 
the grant is based on a complex means test, based on an assets value test and an 
earned income test; there is also a joint assets test, since for married couples the 
joint assets must be less than a designated amount. But the conditionality does 
not stop there, because the scheme also requires applicants to demonstrate a 
medical condition and an incapacity to work. It is this cocktail of tests that is a 
recipe for social disaster. 
In Namibia, although the social pension (a basic income for the elderly) has 
been the pillar propping up many small communities, a disability grant 
modelled on the South African scheme has been growing in significance in the 
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 context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The disability grant has already become 
Namibia’s second most prevalent income support mechanism, part of an 
evolving system of selective, targeted cash transfers that also includes three 
family benefits – the foster parent grant, the child maintenance grant and the 
orphan’s grant. So far, only a few households are receiving any of these family 
benefits, which are means-tested, and thus involve poverty traps and the 
conventional moral hazards that come with all means-tested schemes. 
It is thus not surprising that the means-tested disability grant reaches no 
more than about 20 percent of all those who should be reached, according to 
Namibian census figures for the number of people suffering from a chronic 
physical or mental impairment.7 It is moot whether it reaches many AIDS victims 
who become disabled as the sickness intensifies. If it does not reach them, the 
danger is that anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment will fail since unless a person can 
eat reasonably well the medication will not work. However, if the grant were to 
reach a large proportion of AIDS victims the fiscal cost would be large. 
The immediate problem, however, is the conditionality attached to the 
disability grant. To be entitled, a person must obtain a doctor’s certificate stating 
that he or she is not only disabled but is also unable to work in income-earning 
activity. The rule has been that those with a CD4 count – a measurement of the 
body’s immunity – below a value of 200 are entitled to a temporary disability 
grant, if they pass those means tests. They are supposed to de-register if their 
CD4 count improves to above 200 due to anti-retrovirals. Because of this, 
coupled with the nature of the ARV rollout, in Namibia as in South Africa, a 
bizarre sickness poverty trap has been created. 
In those areas where the rollout of ARVs is operating thus far, if an AIDS 
victim is sufficiently sick, he or she qualifies for treatment. Most of the recipients 
are wretchedly poor. So, it should not be surprising that two tendencies have 
emerged. Some of those receiving ARVs have been sharing their pills with 
relatives and friends who are not quite sick enough to qualify. Taking half the 
dose does not slow down the rate of recovery from the disease; it makes the 
treatment ineffectual and may build up drug resistance. Other ARV recipients 
have been prone to go one stage further – they have been selling the pills. In 
Namibia, some have been selling them over the border in Angola. The need for 
food to survive in the short term overrides the need for health to survive in the 
longer term. Thus, the ARV rollout is likely to fail because it is not linked to 
income security. 
                                                 
7 For a review of the evidence, see Standing (2006). 
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 Second, the work capacity test for eligibility for the disability grant is 
creating a unique moral hazard. If the ARV treatment begins to improve the 
physical and social condition of the patient, so the capacity to work improves. 
And if it does, the patient will lose entitlement to the benefit. Already, in 
Namibia and in South Africa, there are credible anecdotal reports that people are 
stopping ARV treatment in order to push themselves back below the physical 
capacity-for-work level, for fear of losing the grant.8 According to the Treatment 
Action Campaign in South Africa, which has been advocating a universal basic 
income instead, there have been many instances in which patients have simply 
refused treatment for fear of losing their disability grant. 
Furthermore, there are fears that the yo-yo effect, in which sick individuals 
take treatment for a while, see their health improve slightly, stop treatment until 
it worsens, start again, stop again, and so on, is contributing to the development 
of treatment-resistant strains of the disease. 
Thus the disability grant as it has operated in South Africa and Namibia 
must rank as one of the worst designed cash transfer schemes in the world. It is 
unlikely to satisfy any of the policy principles outlined earlier. It is a classic case 
of how a combination of means testing and behaviour testing can achieve 
precisely the opposite of what policymakers intend. Surely, enough is known to 
scrap the work test and the means test in disability grants. 
By contrast, in the early 1990s following Mozambique’s civil war, the 
Government introduced a simple unconditional cash transfer scheme for those 
disabled or displaced known as GAPVU, or “cash payments to war-displaced 
urban destitute households programme”. This reached about 16 percent of urban 
households, and raised average household incomes by as much as 40 percent, 
significantly reducing poverty (Devereux and others, 2005; DFID, 2005; Samson 
and others, 2006). It also helped boost small-scale employment and the 
livelihoods of the urban poor, having a notable effect on food production and 
trading activity. The scheme had a means test, but the authorities largely ignored 
it, which contributed to the programme’s success. 
9. Concluding Remarks 
Industrialized affluent countries have responded to the challenge posed by 
globalization to the traditional social insurance model – fragmentation of family 
structures, decline of full-time stable jobs, the changing nature of risk exposure 
and so on – with a mix of means testing and behaviour testing, coupled with a 
                                                 
8 On the situation in South Africa, see Nattrass (2006a; 2006b). 
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 drift towards social therapy. Yet there is a counter-movement led by what is 
happening in developing countries, where the baggage of 20th century social 
security is light. The industrial labour model clearly does not apply; most people, 
as workers, are outside the “formal” wage labour system; and, most importantly, 
the range of risks to which most people are exposed does not correspond to the 
simple contingency risks that underpinned welfare state development. 
In particular, communities and individuals are exposed much more to 
systemic or co-variant risk. It is absurdly arbitrary to make sharp distinctions 
between the deserving and undeserving in contexts where brute ill-luck and 
chronic uncertainty are the undeniable realities. Emergencies, shocks, crises – all 
force those involved in shaping policy and reacting to events to abandon old 
prejudices and look to what works. 
What does that mean? Ultimately, it means not just having food at the end of 
some dusty road, but being able to develop sustainable livelihoods in viable 
communities based on functioning systems of social solidarity. That lesson is 
being re-learned, posing awkward questions to those wedded to selectivity, 
targeting and conditionality. 
A principal claim in favour of unconditional cash transfers is that, being 
universal, they are socially just. They are non-labourist, in that they do not 
presume that some forms of work are deserving of income support and others 
are not. By making all forms of work equally deserving, they help to promote 
work, and allow individuals to make choices between types of work more easily. 
For that reason, among others, universal cash transfers favour women relative to 
many other forms of social security because each individual receives an 
individual transfer and because those doing non-wage work, such as childcare or 
eldercare, are not penalized. 
Because a universal, unconditional cash transfer is granted as a citizenship 
right, it would enhance full freedom. It would also strengthen the bargaining 
position of disadvantaged groups, whose members usually have to accept 
degrading working conditions and low wages because they are desperate. From 
an economic point of view, it would shift money into the hands of those most 
likely to spend on locally produced goods and services, thus helping to boost 
local demand and employment. 
Compared with means-tested social assistance and social insurance schemes, 
a universal cash transfer would remove the infamous poverty trap, whereby 
someone who raises their earned income just above the threshold used to 
determine eligibility for the cash transfer loses all benefit, and the related 
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 unemployment trap. As such, it would immeasurably reduce the incidence of 
moral hazards and immoral hazards. 
There is another reason for thinking that sooner or later universal basic 
income security will emerge as the sensible and equitable objective from 
experience with targeted, conditional cash transfers. Surveys in many countries 
have found that strong majorities of people believe that everybody should have 
basic income security as a right (ILO, 2004, ch. 13). 
Apart from the moral and political arguments, there are good economic and 
social reasons for moving towards a situation of basic economic security. 
Universal schemes of security are fundamentally market neutral, i.e., they do not 
introduce market distortions and, therefore, have relatively little effect on 
competitiveness. Unlike means-tested social assistance, universalistic schemes do 
not introduce negative incentives to dissave (which would merely store up 
economic vulnerability), and there is no tendency to reward “labour” relative to 
other forms of work. 
At the same time, experience of cash transfer schemes has shown that far 
from breeding dependency and passivity, they foster independence and activity. 
Thus, one study, drawing on data from various surveys conducted by Statistics 
South Africa (the official agency for national statistics), showed that the country’s 
old-age pension, the Child Support Grant and the Disability Grant, all helped to 
raise labour force participation and employment (Samson and others, 2004). 
Moreover, universal security schemes are administratively simple and low-
cost. There is relatively little scope for bureaucratic abuse, discretion or petty 
corruption. The benefits are non-stigmatising and, being universal, they help 
strengthen social solidarity, reinforcing community and social cohesion. 
The cost of cash transfers is not the primary issue, since even poor countries 
could afford modest schemes, and most could do so if more aid were diverted to 
that end. In a simulation study, the UN Development Programme found that 
cash transfers targeting all rural children rather than all identifiably poor 
children would have a greater poverty reduction effect for an allocation of just 
0.5 percent of GDP (Kakwani, Soares and Son, 2005). The study reckoned that 
cash transfers to achieve an income of 40 percent of the poverty line would cost 5 
percent of GDP for the Ivory Coast and more for some other African countries. 
But even small cash transfers would have a big effect in reducing poverty in all 
the 15 countries studied. 
Other simulation studies have found that in countries such as Namibia and 
South Africa a modest basic income as a monthly grant would be affordable, and 
at least one government committee in South Africa has recommended its 
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 introduction.9 Cash grants were also proposed as a response to the Indian Ocean 
tsunami and for the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In the case 
of the post-tsunami recovery phase, the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation actually implemented such a scheme, with apparent success. 
For many years, critics held sway in debates on cash transfers. Now 
conditional cash transfers are legitimized. But the flaws of all forms of targeting, 
selectivity and conditionality, as well as their unnecessary costs, are making 
more people question the need for them. What we can say is that only 
universalistic transfers would satisfy all the Policy Decision Principles 
enunciated earlier and that where they have been tried, including in some of the 
world’s poorest countries, such transfers have proved an effective means to 
combat poverty and income insecurity while promoting livelihoods and work.  
At the time of writing, a small pilot scheme had just been launched in a rural 
area of Namibia that will give all residents aged 0 to 60 a guaranteed basic 
income transfer each month for two years, along the lines of the social pension 
already received by those over 60.10 It is being carefully monitored and the 
outcomes will be carefully evaluated. The evidence should speak. 
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